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“WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GANDER IS SAUCE FOR THE 
GOOSE:” ENFORCING CHILD SUPPORT ON FORMER SAME-SEX 
PARTNERS WHO CREATE A CHILD THROUGH ARTIFICIAL 
INSEMINATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Whether or not marriage of gay couples is legally recognized by individual 
states, same-sex couples are forming unions and creating families.  Adoption 
and new reproductive technologies have facilitated same-sex couples in their 
efforts,1 and the formation of these “nontraditional” families is dramatically on 
the rise.2  Unfortunately, as American society has clearly demonstrated, 
marriages sometimes end with divorce, and legal battles over parental rights 
and obligations involving the children of the marriage follow close behind.3  
Similarly, as ill-prepared courts are finding out all too quickly, unions 
sometimes end with separation, bringing similar legal battles over parental 
rights and obligations involving the children of the union.4 
The number of family law cases involving same-sex partners has risen 
steadily over the last generation, with the majority of cases involving lesbian 
and gay litigants seeking child custody and visitation.5  These cases have led 
the struggle in redefining the legal notion of parenthood.  Many courts have 
recognized the positive benefits of permitting a relationship between a child 
and a non-biological parent to continue after the separation of the partners, and 
have granted non-biological parents custody and visitation rights.6  By 
 
 1. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet 
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 
465-66 (1990). 
 2. THE URBAN INSTITUTE, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE CENSUS: COUPLES WITH 
CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900626_Checkpoints_ 
Couples.pdf (“Ninety-six percent of all U.S. counties have at least one same-sex couple with 
children under 18 in the household . . . .”). 
 3. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, NO. HS-
11 (2003) (charting 21,500,000 divorced men and women in the United States in 2000 compared 
to 16,584,000 just 10 years earlier). 
 4. Nicole Berner, Child Custody Disputes Between Lesbians: Legal Strategies and Their 
Limitations, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 32 (1995). 
 5. Id. at 32. 
 6. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights in Gay and Lesbian Families: a 
Child-Centered Perspective, in CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 273, 285-86 (N.Y.U. Press 2003) 
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contrast, courts have been unwilling to enforce corresponding obligations to 
same-sex parents.  Although for years society has recognized the importance of 
enforcing child support obligations to provide a child with the financial support 
of two adults, courts have been reluctant to enforce these obligations on former 
same-sex partners to assist a child that has been created by artificial 
insemination. Granting rights without enforcing obligations establishes 
contradicting messages regarding a legal recognition of same-sex parents. 
When a child is conceived through the process of artificial insemination 
into a union of two women, “the decision to create the child is even more 
conscious and deliberate than the decision that is made by some couples who 
are both biological parents and conceive a child by direct sexual intercourse.”7  
While the latter could occur in a time span of about ten minutes in an act of 
lust, the former could take weeks if not months to obtain the necessary 
reproductive assistance. 
Child support actions by lesbian mothers represent a unique stage in 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) jurisprudential development 
because these cases are diametrically opposed to child custody and visitation 
cases.8  In child custody and visitation legal battles, the legal parent invokes 
the “traditional” laws of legal parenthood and asks the court to continue 
recognizing differences between same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents so 
their former partner is not awarded any parental rights.9  When a suit is 
brought to enforce child support on a former partner, the roles of the parties 
swap, and it is the non-legal parent who is arguing for the court to apply those 
traditional laws, in order to avoid the legal responsibility of financially 
supporting the child.10 
The California Supreme Court broke new legal ground in the area of 
enforcing child support on same-sex parents in August of 2005.  In opposition 
to the trend to deny enforcement of child support on former partners in a 
homosexual relationship, the court ruled in two cases that lesbian and gay 
partners who plan a family and raise a child together should be considered 
legal parents after a breakup, with the same rights and responsibilities as 
heterosexual parents.11  In coming to this conclusion, the judges took another 
step toward providing for the best interest of all children, regardless of the 
marital status of their parents. 
 
(arguing that “[a] child who has formed a parent-child relationship with a nonbiological co-parent 
or de facto parent has a right to legal recognition and protection of this relationship . . . .”). 
 7. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) (Greaney, J., dissenting). 
 8. Kyle C. Velte, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented Family, 26 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 264 (2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 264-65. 
 11. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005); 
Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692-93 (Cal. 2005). 
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This Note will begin by providing some background information on 
parenthood by artificial insemination.  Part III will review the development of 
existing child-support laws in the United States and how these laws fail to 
address enforcement of child support on former same-sex partners.  Part IV 
will discuss the roadblock to enforcing child support posed by the Uniform 
Parentage Act and will introduce the two cases recently decided by the 
California Supreme Court that demonstrate how courts can overcome this 
roadblock.  The author will analyze the court’s reasoning as well as the legal 
basis for the decisions.  Part V will demonstrate how some courts have used 
the estoppel theory to enforce child support obligations.  It will also discuss 
how courts have turned to arguments of public policy to support both sides of 
the debate.  Part VI will introduce some precautionary measures same-sex 
parents can take to establish parental rights and responsibilities. 
II.  PARENTHOOD BY ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
Medical technologies directed toward human reproduction have advanced 
rapidly during the past decades, but state and federal legislatures have 
responded inadequately to the legal consequences of these new birth 
technologies.12  This has left many courts with the decision of how to define 
parenthood and identify parents in families created by these technologies.  The 
first step to defining parenthood is understanding the process of conception. 
There are two types of fertilization that can cause the initiation of 
pregnancy.13  In vivo fertilization takes place within the body of a woman.  
Artificial insemination is a form of in vivo fertilization similar to natural 
reproduction except that the fertilization is not the direct result of sexual 
intercourse.14  During artificial insemination, sperm is deposited by a plastic 
syringe into the opening of a woman’s uterus shortly after she has ovulated.15  
By contrast, in vitro fertilization takes place outside of the body, where one or 
more ova are removed from the woman by a surgical technique and are placed 
in a dish where processed sperm are mixed with the ova.16  If fertilization 
occurs, the ovum undergoes division, and then within two to three days is 
placed in a woman’s uterine cavity.17 
Recognizing the importance to a child of financial support from two adults, 
many states have enacted laws to provide support for children that are created 
 
 12. Hutton Brown et al., Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, 
Pregnancy and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 602 (1986) (“The resulting lag between technology 
and the law has forced courts to confront new situations that do not fit neatly into the statutory 
framework created to deal with past fact situations.”). 
 13. Id. at 607- 608. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 608. 
 16. Id. at 608-09. 
 17. Id. at 609. 
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through artificial insemination to heterosexual couples.18  These statutes 
recognize the woman’s consenting husband, rather than the sperm donor, as the 
child’s father and are often based on the Uniform Parentage Act, which 
provides that if the husband has consented to artificial insemination, the 
resulting child is the legitimate child of the husband and wife, and that the 
sperm donor has no legally recognized relationship with the child.19  The 
developing statutes and case law enforcing child support on parents from 
artificial insemination, however, generally do not address the issue of parental 
responsibility for same-sex couples who mutually agree to create a child 
through artificial insemination. 
III.  TRADITIONAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
Our current laws on child support enforcement demonstrate that ensuring 
financial support of children, whether from married or unmarried parents, is a 
high priority in our country’s social policy.20  Non-payment of child support 
has been referred to as the nation’s greatest source of financial insecurity and is 
a leading cause of child poverty.21  Children who receive child support perform 
better academically, and are more likely to finish high school and attend 
college.  Studies of the process of child support receipt has shown preexisting 
differences between children who receive support from both parents, and those 
who are supported by the income of only one parent.22 
Child support has historically been left to the states, but in 1950, the 
federal government stepped in by requiring states to notify local law 
enforcement when public assistance was paid out due to the desertion of a 
child by a parent.23  Since the 1950s, the federal government has introduced 
several enforcement mechanisms and required more child support enforcement 
from the states, but state family law statutes still direct the enforcement 
process.24  State courts must interpret and apply state family law statutes.  
Because most family law statutes are drafted as general guidelines, state court 
judges normally have broad discretion in resolving many family law disputes, 
 
 18. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1325 (2004) (noting 
that the statutes, many of which are based upon the Uniform Parentage Act, usually require the 
husband’s written consent to trigger the automatic recognition of his paternal status). 
 19. Id. at 1325; see, e.g. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 
703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 8 (Supp. 2005). 
 20. See Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL 
L. REV. 357, 363-65 (2003) (discussing a brief history of child support enforcement). 
 21. Id. at 360 (“The possibility of a child escaping poverty often depends on whether or not 
the owed child support is being paid.”). 
 22. Id. at 362. 
 23. Id. at 363. 
 24. Id. at 365. 
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including child support litigation.25  This allows many state court judges the 
opportunity to use their position in order to provide for a child whose situation 
is not covered by state statutes, such as those created through artificial 
insemination by same-sex partners. 
Blood ties are and always have been a principal determinant of personal 
relationships and resulting legal rights.  Stemming from this notion, the 
concept of legitimacy and a preference for the child of legitimate birth 
emerged in early law.26  Under English and American common law, children 
born out of wedlock were subject to different laws and different rights than 
“legitimate children,” (those born to married parents).27  In the United States, 
the historical treatment of non-marital children paid no regard to the needs of 
the child.  Rather, the laws resulted in the punishment of the child under the 
rationale of protecting the exclusivity of the marital unit and punishing a 
woman who engaged in sex outside of marriage.28  A series of U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions between 1968 and 1983 and the enactment of the Uniform 
Parentage Act have all but eliminated legal discrimination based on the 
“legitimacy” of a child.29 
One reason for the negative social attitude toward children born out of 
wedlock is the fact that illegitimacy is often accompanied by poverty.30  Two 
married parents in a family setting are likely to provide a better economic 
 
 25. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 459 (2004). 
 26. Paula A. Monopoli, Deadbeat Dads: Should Support and Inheritance be Linked?, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 257, 262-63 (1994). 
 27. Id. (noting that an illegitimate child could not inherit money from anyone, and common 
law did not impose upon the biological father any legal liability to support his offspring). 
 28. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (1992). 
 29. Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 
NEV. L. J. 141, 154 (2004); Sanja Zgonjanin, What Does It Take To Be a (Lesbian) Parent? On 
Intent and Genetics, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 259 (2005); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT, § 202, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (striking down a six-
year Pennsylvania statute limiting the time to bring a support action for non-marital children, 
because the statute did not withstand the heightened scrutiny test under the Equal Protection 
Clause when compared to support rights of marital children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 539 
(1973) (holding that there was a constitutional duty of both parents to support a non-marital child, 
once paternity had been proved); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 
(1972) (holding that a non-marital child could also recover under state worker’s compensation 
laws); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968) (holding that non-marital children were 
clearly persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, and it would be “invidious to discriminate against them when no action, conduct or 
demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done [to their] mother”). 
 30. Carole M. Hirsch, When the War on Poverty Became the War on Poor, Pregnant 
Women: Political Rhetoric, the Unconstitutional Conditions of Doctrine, and the Family Cap 
Restriction, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW. 335, 341 (2002) (noting that this correlation has 
lead to the stereotype that unwed mothers are lazy and undeserving). 
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climate for child rearing than an unmarried, all too often very young mother.31  
The underlying causes for the sobering statistics of non-marital births and 
unplanned pregnancies are undoubtedly complex, but it remains up to the 
legislators and jurists to ensure that the non-marital child’s best interests and 
welfare continue to be legally protected.  This includes protection of those 
children who are created through artificial insemination, regardless of the 
sexual orientation of their parents. 
Federal legislation concerning child support enforcement has provided a 
substantial boost in the fortunes of non-marital children.  Congress has 
mandated that states enact child support guidelines in order to receive federal 
funds, in an attempt to make child support awards more uniform and to 
increase award levels and efficiency.32  As a condition to participation in the 
Federal program, the states are required to provide effective means for the 
establishment of paternity of non-marital children.33  As a result, states 
established stricter means of enforcing child support. 
The Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973 and revised in 2000, contains 
guiding principles of full equality for all children in their legal relationship 
with both parents, whatever their parents’ marital status.34  By 2000, the UPA 
had been adopted in nineteen states and adapted in many more.35  The Act 
provides that the parent-child relationship extends to every child and every 
parent.36  It also delineates various methods for establishing a parent-child 
relationship.37  It has been held, however, that the UPA has no application in a 
legal dispute between parties involved in a homosexual relationship.38 
Child support orders are issued upon a non-custodial parent based on the 
principle that parents have an obligation to support their children financially 
through childhood, even upon dissolution of the adult relationship.39  Parenting 
rights and responsibilities typically go together: if you are a legal parent, you 
have both; if you are not a legal parent, you have neither.  However, up to this 
point in legal history, homosexual parents have been treated differently.  
Courts have granted many non-biological partners in a homosexual 
 
 31. Swank, supra note 20, at 360. 
 32. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 459-60. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 667, 668 (2005). 
 34. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 955-56. 
 35. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 296 at Prefatory Note (2001). 
 36. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 103 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 2005). 
 37. Id. at § 201. 
 38. See, e.g., Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that 
the Uniform Parentage Act, which deals with the rights of children and the determination of 
parentage, has no application where it was undisputed that a woman who had a homosexual 
relationship with the natural mother of the child who sought custody and visitation with the child, 
was not the natural mother). 
 39. Velte, supra note 8, at 263. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] “WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GANDER IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE” 225 
relationship rights of visitation and custody.  Only a few, however, have 
enforced the coinciding parental responsibilities to non-biological partners 
from homosexual relationships. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution requires states to enforce 
child support regardless of whether the parents of the child were ever 
married.40  Although the law no longer discriminates against illegitimate 
children, there is a new category of children who are left without the support of 
the American legal system, and who are being discriminated against through 
no fault of their own – those created by same-sex couples through artificial 
insemination. 
IV.  A ROADBLOCK TO ENFORCEMENT BY THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
AND A DETOUR BY THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
A. The Uniform Parentage Act: A Roadblock to Enforcing Child Support 
Obligations of Same-Sex Parents 
The current language of the Uniform Parentage Act provides a defense to 
actions for child support by former domestic partners.41  A former domestic 
partner is not a parent within the meaning of the UPA, and thus according to 
some courts, does not have any of the rights or obligations arising from the 
parent and child relationship.42  Designed to equalize the legal and social status 
of children born out of wedlock, the prefatory note of the UPA includes the 
declaration that all children should be treated equally without regard to marital 
status of the parents.43  With this goal in mind, UPA section 703 states that if a 
woman is married to someone other than a semen donor, then her husband’s 
consent to the assisted reproduction is sufficient to make him the father.44  The 
Act, however, is silent on the impact of artificial insemination of a woman with 
a domestic partner.  Due to the precise statutory language of the Act, some 
courts in states that have adopted the Act have relied on it in refusing to 
recognize any parental responsibilities on former-domestic partners who 
participated in an artificial insemination process.45 
 
 40. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). 
 41. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 2005). 
 42. Id. at §§ 102 (14), 201 (Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship). 
 43. Id. at Prefatory Note. 
 44. See also, id. at § 201 (“The father-child relationship is established between a man and a 
child by . . . the man’s having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman . . . which resulted 
in the birth of the child.”); Polikoff, supra note 1, at 540 n. 459 (“It was fifteen years after the 
Act’s adoption, in 1988, that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
approved legislation acknowledging the practice of alternative insemination of unmarried 
women.”). 
 45. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that 
a lesbian who was not the natural or adoptive mother of her former partner’s two children could 
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In California, a state that has adopted the pertinent part of the UPA, lower 
courts initially relied on the statutory language of the UPA to deny actions to 
establish that a former same-sex partner was obliged to pay child support.46  
Elisa Maria B. v. The Superior Court of El Dorado County, recently decided 
by the California Supreme Court, is the first case in California to bypass the 
strict language of the UPA.47 
The trial court and appellate court decisions in Elisa Maria B. paved the 
way for the decision by the Supreme Court of California, by developing 
theories of equity to enforce child support on a former domestic partner.  The 
case involved two female partners who each gave birth to children conceived 
by artificial insemination.48  Elisa delivered a boy and Emily had twins.  They 
selected the children’s names together, hyphenated the women’s last names as 
the children’s surname, and considered them to be “children of both women.”49  
Elisa provided financial support and medical insurance for the children and 
claimed all three children as dependants for income tax purposes.50  Six years 
after they began living together, the women split up and separated their 
children.51  Elisa agreed to provide financial support for Emily’s twins “when 
she could.”  Almost a year and a half later, Elisa stopped sending money and 
stopped seeing the twins.52 
Emily began receiving public assistance for the twins, and the County of El 
Dorado filed an action to establish that Elisa is a “parent” of the twins in order 
to impose a child support obligation.53  Elisa argued that she is not a parent of 
the twins within the meaning of the UPA and, thus, does not have any of the 
rights or obligations arising from the parent and child relationship.54 
The trial court found that Elisa should be “held to the same legal duty and 
responsibilities of a man found to be a presumed father” under the UPA.55  
 
not establish the existence of a parent-child relationship under the UPA even if she helped 
facilitate the conception and birth and assumed parental responsibilities); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 
Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that although UPA “confers standing upon any 
interested person to bring an action to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship,” this 
does not extend to a woman who did not have a biological or adoptive relationship with the child 
of her former partner in a same-sex relationship). 
 46. Elisa Maria B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005). 
 47. Elisa Maria B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 496. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 498. 
 52. Id. at 496 (The court noted that Elisa claimed this infraction was because she did not 
want to have to deal with Emily due to the tension between them.). 
 53. Elisa Maria B., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 497. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 499. 
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Recognizing the unfairness of an individual intentionally entering an 
agreement to become a parent and then abandoning the responsibilities that go 
along with that decision, the trial court used the doctrine of estoppel to enforce 
child support upon Elisa.56  Because Elisa “consented to the creation of these 
children and encouraged their creation,” she is precluded by principals of 
promissory or equitable estoppel from disclaiming financial responsibility for 
them, according to the court.57 
On appeal, Elisa argued for a strict reading of the Uniform Parentage Act 
by asserting that the court could not impose a parental obligation of support on 
her because she is not a parent under the Uniform Parentage Act.58  The Court 
of Appeals agreed, read the language of the Uniform Parentage Act strictly, 
and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its 
order and enter judgment in favor of Elisa.59 
Emily’s situation precluded the enactment of the Domestic Partnership Act 
by the California Legislature, a statutory recognition and response to the 
problem of defining legal parenthood and its coinciding rights and 
responsibilities.  The new law gives domestic partners most of the same rights 
as opposite sex spouses, including parental rights.  California law now allows 
domestic partners to register with the Secretary of State to receive these rights 
under the Domestic Partnership Act.60  In 2003, the Legislature added section 
297.5 to the Family Code that states in pertinent part: 
The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a 
child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses.  The rights and 
obligations of those spouses registered domestic partners with respect to a 
child of either of them shall be the same as those of former or surviving 
spouses.61 
The Domestic Partnership Act will make parentage automatic for children born 
to registered domestic partners during their partnership.  This means that 
children will be assured, at least in California, of knowing they have two legal 
parents, and the availability of child support will mean fewer former partners 
left financially dependent on the state because of dissolution of their 
relationship.62  The Domestic Partnership Act, however, did not apply to this 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 497. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Elisa Maria B., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 497. 
 60. Diana Richmond, Tax Pitfalls Under the California Domestic Partnership Act, CAL. 
FAM. L. MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2004, at 346 (“New Family Code section 297.5 declares that 
registered domestic partners shall have the same rights and responsibilities as are granted to and 
imposed upon spouses.”). 
 61. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004). 
 62. Richmond, supra note 60, at 347. 
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case because it did not become effective until January 1, 2005, and because 
there is no evidence that Elisa and Emily ever registered as domestic partners. 
In overturning the trial court, the Court of Appeals began its opinion by 
distinguishing Emily’s role as natural mother of the child from Elisa’s 
unrecognized role, and held that Elisa had no legal maternal relationship with 
the children under the UPA.  For any child, California law recognizes only one 
natural mother.63  The court referred to the language used in the UPA, which 
states that the term “parent-child relationship” means the “legal relationship 
existing between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents incident to 
which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.  
The term includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child 
relationship.”64  Since Elisa is not the twins’ natural mother and because she 
did not adopt the twins, according to the court, Elisa does not have any rights, 
privileges, duties, or obligations of a parent under the UPA.65 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider public policy in making its 
decision, stating that such decisions should be left to the legislature.66  The 
court should have recognized that the California Legislature had already 
considered this policy debate and in response passed the Domestic Partnership 
Act.  The court’s decision also failed to take into consideration that the drafters 
of the UPA identified as a “notable feature” of the Act: “the declaration of 
equality for all children without regard to marital status of the parents of a 
particular child.”67  The drafters of the UPA included section 202 that states 
that a child born to parents who are not married to each other has the same 
rights under the law as a child born to parents who are married to each other.68  
Both of these inclusions in the UPA support a decision to provide for the best 
 
 63. For former California cases, see Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that, 
although the UPA confers standing upon any interested person to bring an action to establish the 
existence of a parent-child relationship, the Legislature has not conferred upon a former lesbian 
partner who did not have a biological or adoptive relationship with the child of her former partner 
in a same-sex relationship, any right of custody or visitation upon the termination of the 
relationship.).  The Court held that a lesbian who was not the natural or adoptive mother of her 
former partner’s two children “could not establish under the existence of a parent-child 
relationship under the [UPA]” even if “she helped facilitated the conception and birth of both 
children and immediately after the birth assumed all the responsibilities of a parent.”  Nancy S., 
279 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16. 
 64. Elisa Maria B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
 65. Id. at 500. 
 66. Id. at 507 (“Whether and in what circumstances a person in a same-sex relationship, who 
is not related to the children born during the relationship, should have the rights or obligations of 
a parent are matters plainly within the realm of legislative policy.”). 
 67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 296 at Prefatory Note (2001). 
 68. Id. at § 202 (No Discrimination Based on Marital Status). 
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interest of the child, and to force those individuals who actively participate in 
the conception of a child to be responsible for his or her actions.  The Court of 
Appeals not only failed to recognize public policy that has been promoted by 
the California Legislature recognizing the relationships of domestic partners, 
but also applied the UPA too strictly rather than using the law to make 
decisions that provide for the best interest of the child. 
While the Court of Appeals of the Third District of California accepted the 
argument in Elisa B. that child support could not be enforced upon a former 
domestic partner because of the definition of parent under the UPA, the Court 
of Appeals of the Second District came to a different conclusion regarding the 
parental rights and responsibilities of former same-sex partners.  In Kristine 
Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R, as in Elisa B., two women in a long-term relationship 
decided to have children and arranged for one of them to conceive a child 
through artificial insemination.69  Before the child was born, however, the 
women obtained a judgment from the court based on a stipulation in which 
they declared themselves to be the “joint intended legal parents” of the unborn 
child.70  Following the child’s birth, the couple raised the child together for 
almost two years.  The women then separated and the natural mother brought a 
motion to vacate the judgment so that her former partner could not obtain any 
custody or visitation.71 
Although this case does not discuss the issue of child support, the Second 
District found a way to read past the strict language of the UPA and recognize 
the parental status of a former domestic partner.  Here, the natural parent 
attempted to use the UPA to argue that her former partner had no parental 
rights.72  She sought to have the judgment regarding their former parental 
agreement vacated on the ground that the family court lacked jurisdiction 
under California’s version of the UPA.  The family court denied the motion, 
and the biological mother appealed.73 
The Second District considered whether the biological mother’s former 
partner could be considered a parent under the UPA.74  Recognizing the court’s 
conclusion differed from the one reached by the Third District in Elisa B., the 
Second District found that the UPA does provide a basis upon which the 
former partner can establish parentage.  The court referred to the recognition of 
 
 69. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 117 P.3d 
690 (Cal. 2005). 
 70. Id.  The pre-birth judgment was later found to be void because a determination of 
parentage cannot rest simply on the parties’ agreement.  According to the court, the sole basis 
upon which the family court could determine parentage is under the Uniform Parentage Act.  Id. 
at 126. 
 71. Id. at 125. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Kristine H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 126. 
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“presumed fathers” by the UPA, finding that just as the UPA recognized 
“presumed fathers” it also can be read to recognize “presumed mothers.” The 
Court held as follows: 
While such a conclusion under the Act may not be a result that the Legislature 
expressly contemplated, the Act does mandate that we read the provisions in a 
gender-neutral manner and that mandate compels our conclusion.  The Act 
states that insofar as practicable, the provisions that are applicable to 
establishing a father and child relationship apply to determine the existence of 
a mother and child relationship.75 
Because the former partner is neither a natural mother nor an adoptive mother, 
the Court concluded that it could look to the provisions of the Act establishing 
the father-child relationship to determine whether the former partner can 
establish parentage.76 
According to the Second District, Section 7611, subdivision (d) of the 
California adopted UPA establishes a presumption.  The statute provides that a 
man is presumed to be a parent of a child if “he receives the child into his 
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”  When read in a 
gender-neutral manner, the statute provides that a woman is presumed to be a 
parent of a child if “[she] receives the child into [her] home and openly holds 
out the child as h[er] natural child.”77  The court found no prohibition in the 
Act that prevented them from concluding that a child has two parents of the 
same sex, especially where no one other than the partner is “vying to become 
the child’s second parent.”78 
To support its decision, the court reiterated the Act’s rule that the parent-
child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent regardless 
of the marital status of the parent.79  Therefore, the marital status of the two 
women is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether there is a second 
parent. The Act contemplates two legal parents irrespective of their gender.  
Disregarding the fact that its decision may prove controversial, the Second 
District placed great weight on policy considerations, noting that the state has a 
compelling interest in establishing parentage, and holding parents, rather than 
the state, responsible for their children’s care.80 
 
 75. Id. (referring to CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2004)).  This section is the same in 
substance as UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. (1973). 
 76. In coming to this conclusion, the court referred to the Legislature’s passing of the 
California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, discussed supra note 7, to 
show legislature’s intent of recognizing former domestic partners as parents. Id. at 126 n.5. 
 77. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004). 
 78. Kristine H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 126. 
 79. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 202, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001) (No Discrimination Based on 
Marital Status). 
 80. Kristine H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 135. 
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B. “What is Sauce for the Gander is Sauce for the Goose” 
The California Supreme Court, in hearing Elisa B. and Kristine, sided with 
the Court of Appeals of the Second District and unanimously decided to 
recognize “presumed” parenthood for same-sex parents.81  In Elisa B. the court 
concluded that a woman who agrees to raise children with her lesbian partner, 
supports her partner’s artificial insemination using an anonymous donor, and 
receives the resulting children into her home and holds them out as her own, is 
the child’s presumed parent under the Uniform Parentage Act and has an 
obligation to support the child.82  In Kristine, the court invoked the doctrine of 
estoppel to hold that a biological mother could not attack the validity of a 
judgment to which she had stipulated to naming her former partner as a legal 
parent.83 
Both cases decided by the California Supreme Court involved couples that 
had made deliberate decisions to bring a child into the world through artificial 
insemination.  The gender-specific statutory language presented in the Uniform 
Parentage Act posed a problem for the lower courts in finding the former 
partner to be a legal parent.  The California Supreme Court, noting support 
from both public policy and equity rationales, accepted the detour introduced 
by the Second District, and paved the way for California lower courts as well 
as other states to begin enforcing child support obligations when it is necessary 
in untraditional families. 
In overturning the Third District of California’s decision in Elisa B, the 
California Supreme Court referred to the discrimination that previously existed 
in the law with respect to children born to unmarried parents, and noted that 
the UPA was enacted, in part, to end such discrimination.84  One purpose of 
the UPA was to eliminate distinctions based upon whether a child was born 
into a marriage, and thus was “legitimate,” or was born to unmarried parents, 
and thus was “illegitimate.”  Regardless of the marital status of the parents, the 
UPA provides that the parent and child relationship extends equally to every 
child and to every parent.85 
The California Supreme Court found the facts of the case perhaps the most 
compelling reason for enforcing child support obligations.86  It recognized that 
it was undisputed that Elisa actively consented to, and participated in, the 
artificial insemination of her partner with the understanding that the resulting 
 
 81. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Kristine 
H. v. Lisa R, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). 
 82. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670. 
 83. Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 693. 
 84. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 664. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 669. 
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child or children would be raised by Emily and her as co-parents, and they did 
act as co-parents for a substantial period of time.87 
According to the court, a declaration that Elisa was not a parent of the 
twins and, thus, had no obligation to support them because she is not 
biologically related to them would leave the children with the support of only 
one parent.88  The financial burden would be borne by the country rather than 
Elisa because Emily is financially unable to support the twins on her own.89  
The Court quoted the California Legislature in stating: 
There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all children.  
Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support award, which, in 
turn, provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, including, but 
not limited to, social security, health insurance, survivors’ benefits, military 
benefits, and inheritance rights . . . .90 
By recognizing the value of determining paternity, the Legislature implicitly 
recognized the value of having two parents, rather than one, as a source of both 
emotional and financial support, especially when the obligation to support the 
child would otherwise be on the public. 
The court’s decision is rational and provides for the best interest of the 
child.  Society for decades has found the financial abandonment of a child 
unacceptable and has imposed child support obligations when the child is 
conceived through natural reproduction. The court is simply recognizing the 
hypocrisy in not enforcing the same obligations in artificial insemination cases. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennard writes: 
Had a man who, like Elisa, lacked any biological connection to the twins 
received them into his home and held them out as his natural children, this case 
would undoubtedly have resulted in determination that he met the statutory 
criteria for being the presumed father of the twins.  These legal principles 
apply with equal force in this case, where Elisa, whom the county seeks to hold 
financially accountable for support of the twins, meets the statutory criteria of 
a presumed mother, a status that brings with it the benefits as well as the 
responsibilities of parenthood.91 
Justice Kennard concludes his opinion with the “flip side” of an old adage, 
“What is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose.”92 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 669. 
 89. Id. at 664. 
 90. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669. 
 91. Id. at 673 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. 
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C. “Presumed” Parents 
The recognition of “presumed fathers” by the Uniform Parentage Act 
demonstrates the importance of preserving an intact family unit and existing 
parent-child relationships to the drafters of the Act. These presumptions are 
founded on the principles of stability for the child and ensuring that the child 
will continue to reap the benefits, especially financial benefits, of having two 
legal parents.93  Applying these principles to preserve familial relationships 
demonstrates that having parents – socially, emotionally, and financially – is 
more important than a biological or adoptive connection to the child.  These 
principles are equally applicable to lesbian co-parents.  Thus, the issue of UPA 
application to lesbian co-parents is not so contrary to the language of the UPA. 
Elisa became a “presumed parent” of the twins, according the Supreme 
Court of California, when she both received the twins into her home and 
openly held them out as her own.94  This legal presumption of motherhood can 
be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.95  Justice Kennard, in his 
concurring opinion, opined that permitting a rebuttal in this case would be 
inappropriate because it would leave the children with the financial support of 
only one parent.96 
Following a similar rationale, the Supreme Court of California concluded 
in Kristine, that the biological mother was estopped from arguing that her 
former partner was not a legally recognized parent by the UPA.97  Regardless 
of whether the stipulated judgment was enforceable, the UPA recognizes the 
former partner as a “presumed parent.”  Ultimately, however, the court relied 
upon the estoppel doctrine.98  The court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
determine the parentage of the unborn child because Kristine invoked that 
jurisdiction, stipulated to the issuance of a judgment, and enjoyed the benefits 
of that judgment for nearly two years.  Therefore, the court found it would be 
unfair both to Lisa and the child to permit Kristine to challenge the validity of 
that judgment.99 
V.  USE OF THE ESTOPPEL THEORY TO ENFORCE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
AND THE CHANGING ROLES OF “PUBLIC POLICY” 
Kristine is not the only case to introduce the estoppel theory in determining 
parental rights and obligations for same-sex parents.100  The use of the estoppel 
 
 93. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 955, 968. 
 94. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670. 
 95. Id. at 667. 
 96. Id. at 673 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
 97. Kristine H. v. Lisa R, 117 P.3d 690, 693 (Cal. 2005). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 696. 
 100. Id. at 693. 
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theory to enforce child support is based on the reliance component that exists 
in many fact situations of same sex-partners who create a child through 
artificial insemination.  When entering into the realm of parenthood, one 
partner relies on the promise of the other partner to share both the benefits and 
responsibilities of starting a family together. 
Estoppel is a doctrine of fundamental fairness designed to preclude a party 
from depriving another of a reasonable expectation when the party inducing 
the expectation knew or should have known that the other would rely upon the 
conduct to his detriment.101 The argument is that when a former partner assists 
in the process of artificial insemination, invites the child into the home and 
holds the child out as their own, they should not later be able to walk out on 
that child.  The contract theory of promissory estoppel enforces a promise that 
“the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the 
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance.”102  Such a promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.103 
According to the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution, a parent by estoppel is one who, although not a biological or 
adoptive parent: 
Lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibility as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement 
with the child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with full parental 
rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the 
individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests.104 
The determination of whether to recognize parenthood through estoppel and 
whether to enforce child support obligations will depend largely on the facts of 
each individual case: How involved was the parent?  How long had they 
assisted in raising the child?  What conversations occurred before the artificial 
insemination process regarding the responsibilities of each partner? If the 
promisor knows or should have known that the promissee would rely on his 
promise, than enforcement of the contract is necessary to avoid injustice.105 
 
 101. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 827, 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (2003). 
 103. Id. 
 104. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1)(b) (2002). This source is published by 
the American Law Institute to offer “a legal framework that can accommodate the different 
choices people make and the different expectations they bring to their family relationships.”  Id. at 
Director’s Foreward at xv.  See also, Margaret S. Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions 
to Adjudicate Parentage for Lesbian Co-parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 389 (2004). 
 105. Osborne, supra note 104, at 389. 
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A. “You Promised!” Application of Estoppel Doctrine to Enforce Child 
Support on Same-Sex Parents: L.S.K. v. H.A.N. 
When the Pennsylvania Superior Court handed down its decision in L.S.K. 
v. H.A.N. on Dec. 17, 2002, it became the first appellate court in the nation to 
apply the estoppel doctrine to preclude a former domestic partner from 
defending against paying child support by arguing that she or he was not the 
biological parent of the child in question.106  The court considered a question 
of first impression: whether a woman owes a duty of support to the children of 
her former lesbian partner.107  The two women, L.S.K. (biological mother) and 
H.A.N., were involved in a relationship for more than a decade when they 
decided to have children together.108  From two pregnancies created by 
artificial insemination, L.S.K. gave birth to five children.109  Because H.A.N. 
was laid off from her job when the first child was born, L.S.K. returned to 
work while H.A.N. cared for the child.  During the second pregnancy, L.S.K. 
became incapacitated and H.A.N. took care of her.110  After the second birth, 
L.S.K. again returned to work while H.A.N. stayed home and cared for the 
children.  The parties separated in the fall of 1997, when the oldest child was 
six, and the other four children were four years old.111 
In February of 1998, H.A.N. filed a complaint requesting an order granting 
her custody of the children.112  This action provided the stepping-stone for the 
court to enforce a child support obligation upon a same-sex partner by using 
the estoppel theory.113  In response, L.S.K. filed an action seeking child 
support for the five children.  H.A.N. alleged that there was no legal cause of 
action against her for child support in the absence of an order grating her legal 
custody or in loco parentis114 status.115  The trial court found that H.A.N’s 
 
 106. Lawrence W. Abel, Can a Woman Father a Child? Recent Rulings in Pennsylvania 
Point to the Affirmative. Is Your State Far Behind?, THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, June 10, 
2003, at 1. 
 107. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 827, 876 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
 108. Id. at 874-75 (noting that although they originally planned on taking turns getting 
pregnant, due to a medical condition, H.A.N. could not bear children). 
 109. Id. (noting that one child was conceived from the first artificial insemination, and four 
children were conceived at the second insemination). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 875 (noting that the mother was transferred and moved with the children to San 
Diego, California and the former partner remained in Pennsylvania). 
 112. Id. at 876. 
 113. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 876 (“[E]quity mandates that H.A.N. cannot maintain the status of in 
loco parentis to pursue [a custody] action as to the children, alleging she has acquired rights to 
them, and at the same time deny any obligation for support merely because there was no 
agreement to do so.”). 
 114. Id.  (“The phrase in loco parentis refers to someone who is not a lawful party but puts 
oneself in the situation by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationships without 
going through the formality of a legal adoption.”). 
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conduct in seeking custody of the children demonstrated her previous intent to 
be a parent and estopped her from claiming that she was not liable for 
support.116 
Upon review, the Superior Court noted that during the custody litigation, 
H.A.N. had established her in loco parentis status, which allowed her standing 
in the custody litigation, and through which she gained legal, as well as 
physical, custody.117  Recognizing the hypocrisy in H.A.N.’s refusal to pay 
child support after succeeding in gaining child custody, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to enforce child support on the former domestic 
partner.118  The Superior Court’s decision to affirm relied in part on equitable 
considerations brought on by H.A.N.’s seeking and receiving custody rights,119 
and was supported by public policy arguments to provide for the best interests 
of the children.120 
This case presents a set of facts where one partner’s conduct evinces a 
powerful case of actual consent to the creation of the child.  The allegations 
demonstrate a deliberate course of conduct with the precise goal of causing the 
birth of these children. In L.S.K., the Superior Court took into consideration 
that H.A.N. “acted as a ‘co-parent’ with Mother in all areas concerning the 
children’s conception, care and support.”121  For example, besides agreeing to 
have children through artificial insemination, H.A.N. was the mother’s partner 
in childbirth classes and active in the delivery room, assisted in selecting the 
names of the children, had her family members serve as godparents, and stayed 
home and cared for the children while L.S.K. continued her career.122 
In response to H.A.N.’s argument that an absence of legislation on the 
matter prevents any enforcement, the court held that equitable considerations 
“can be applied in weighing what is just and necessary to protect the rights, 
interests and welfare of the children involved.”123  In deciding this manner, the 
court did not hide from the controversial topic but took on its role to 
supplement where legislation was lacking, noting: 
 
 115. Id. at 875. 
 116. Id. (noting that a support conference was held before a hearing officer and on February 
12, 2002, the trial court entered a final order effective May 22, 1998, directing H.A.N. to pay 
child support to the mother for the five children). 
 117. Id. at 876.  (“H.A.N.’s in loco parentis status allowed her to have standing to petition for 
custody of the children.”). 
 118. Id. at 874. 
 119. L.S.K., A.2d at 877; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 120. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 878 (“[C]ourts must construct a fair, workable and responsible basis 
for the protection of children . . . in order to protect the best interest of the children involved, both 
parties are to be responsible for the emotional and financial needs of the children.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (The court also noted that H.A.N. was involved in the children’s day-to-day care and 
schooling, as well as health needs for over eight years.). 
 123. Id. 
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We recognize this is a matter which is better addressed by the legislature rather 
than the courts.  However, in the absence of legislative mandates, the courts 
must construct a fair, workable and responsible basis for the protection of 
children, aside from whatever rights the adults may have vis a vis each 
other.124 
The court relied on the doctrine of in loco parentis in making its equitable 
decision.125  This doctrine recognizes parenthood in an adult who acts like a 
parent and voluntarily takes over custodial duties as if she were the parent.  It 
imposes on this person the same duties and responsibilities as would be 
imposed on a natural parent.126  Spells v. Spells formulated the in loco parentis 
doctrine as follows: 
[A] person may put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the 
obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the 
formality of a legal adoption.  This status, [known as in loco parentis] 
embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and second, the 
discharge of parental duties . . . .  The rights and liabilities arising out of that 
relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and 
child.127 
In loco parentis has been used in cases brought by step-parents attempting to 
overcome the barriers raised by not being a biological parent.128  The weakness 
of an in loco parentis argument is that courts apply it selectively.  However, 
some courts concerned with the best interests of children are unwilling to 
ignore the importance of parental relationships children develop with those 
who are not their legal parents.129  It was the Superior Court’s innovative legal 
framework of combining in loco parentis status and the Doctrine of Estoppel 
that lead to its decision to enforce child support on a former same-sex 
partner.130 
B. “We’re Having a Baby – But You’re Supporting It!”  Public Policy and 
Refusing to Enforce an Agreement to Support a Child: T.F. v. B.L 
Most courts are hesitant to apply the estoppel theory and recognize legal 
parenthood for same-sex partners.  Public policy arguments are often used to 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 876. 
 126. Polikoff, supra note 1, at 502. 
 127. Id. at 502-03.  See also Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). 
 128. Seger v. Seger, 547 A.R.2d 424, 428 (Pa. Super 1988) (holding that partial custody and 
visitation were appropriate for a nonbiological father who had raised his wife’s child as his own); 
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978) (holding that a stepfather standing in loco 
parentis to his stepson was a parent for purposes of the statute authorizing visitation by parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives). 
 129. Polikoff, supra note 1, at 503. 
 130. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 874. 
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rationalize a contrary decision.  In doing so, courts ignore the public policy of 
providing for the best interest of the child.  Thus, the role of public policy is on 
both sides of the enforcement battle.  Considerations of public policy have 
been used to support decisions both enforcing and not enforcing child support 
obligations. 
T.F. and B.L., two women who had a “commitment ceremony,” began 
living together in the fall of 1996, and for the next four years pooled their 
money and nominated each other as beneficiaries of their life insurance 
policies and retirement plans.131  Not unlike many couples beginning their life 
together, T.F. and B.L. began discussing raising a child.132  B.L. was hesitant 
at first and unsure of her ability to be a parent, but later told T.F. that she too 
wanted to have a child.  Excited about the possible new addition to their 
family, the couple talked extensively about the life-changing decision.133  They 
discussed B.L.’s reasons for her change of heart as well as such topics as 
whether they would rather have a boy or a girl, baptism, schooling, and the 
division of labor between the couple should they have the child.134  As a result 
of their conversations, T.F. scheduled several appointments at a fertility clinic 
and both women attended the appointments.135  After rejecting other options 
such as adoption or a foster child, the couple decided together to proceed with 
the T.F.’s artificial insemination.136 
The couple both selected the anonymous donor, and used joint funds for 
insemination and prenatal care expenses.137  After several insemination 
procedures, T.F. became pregnant.138  The couples’ relationship deteriorated in 
the following months, and B.L. moved out of the shared apartment in May 
2000.  Prior to leaving, B.L. expressed her regrets about being a “separated 
parent,” and said she desired to adopt the child and promised to talk later about 
the details.  Two months later, T.F. gave birth to a boy.139 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that B.L. was not 
responsible for supporting the child that she had previously agreed to raise.140  
Ultimately, the court’s reasoning and analysis builds a better argument for the 
opposite outcome: enforcement of child support. 
 
 131. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Mass. 2004). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1247. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1247-48. 
 140. Id. at 1253 (“Because the defendant is not a parent under any of the statutory provisions 
enacted to establish parenthood, she has no duty to support the child financially, and she may not 
be ordered to pay support.”). 
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The court affirmed the trial judge’s finding that there was an agreement by 
B.L. to accept the responsibilities of becoming a parent in consideration for 
T.F.’s conceiving and bearing a child.141  The two women lived together for 
several years, pooled their finances, and had extensive conversations regarding 
the child.142  It is reasonable to conclude that T.F. relied upon B.L.’s 
agreement.  B.L. did not object to having a child.  Rather, the court noted, she 
actively participated in medical decisions, procedures, and discussions about 
the child’s future and finances related to the conception and raising of the 
child.143  The majority held that a finding of implied contract on these facts 
was permissible.144 
T.F.’s roadblock, which serves as a roadblock for same-sex parents across 
the country attempting to enforce child support against former partners, lies 
solely in the court’s public policy argument.  All other discussion by the court 
regarding enforcement seems to support a contrary decision.  For example, the 
majority recognized that contracts between unmarried cohabitants regarding 
property, finance, and other matters are normally enforceable in 
Massachusetts, and furthermore, contracts that may concern the welfare and 
support of children are enforceable provided they do not contravene the best 
interest of the child.145  The majority also recognized that “contracts between 
unmarried same-sex couples concerning the welfare and support of a child 
stand on the same footing as any other agreement between unmarried 
cohabitants.”146  Rather than hinge its decision on the fair and equitable 
outcome that is dictated by the facts, the majority held that this contract 
violates or conflicts with public policy and treats it as void.147  The court 
stated, “[t]he decision to become, or not to become a parent is a personal right 
of such delicate and intimate character that direct enforcement . . . by any 
process of the court should never be attempted.”148 
In demonstrating the public policy not to enforce agreements to become 
parents, the majority refers to a case previously decided by the court, A.Z. v. 
B.L., where a plaintiff prevented his estranged wife from using his own sperm 
(which had been frozen and stored by an in vitro fertilization clinic) to create a 
child.149  In A.Z., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to 
enforce an agreement that compelled the husband to become a parent against 
 
 141. Id. at 1249. 
 142. Id. 
 143. T.F., 813 N.E.2d t 1249. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1249-50 (giving reasoning which supports an opposite conclusion). 
 146. Id. at 1250. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (referring to principles expressed by the court in A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 150, 160 
(2000)). 
 149. Id. at 1250; A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000). 
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his will.150  A.Z. is a case where a husband is preventing a wife from creating a 
child from his sperm.151  In T.F., however, a child has already been created 
through the efforts of both parents.  The court finds that the same public policy 
issue, not to enforce agreements to become parents, is underlying both 
cases.152 
The majority completely ignores a very important and significant factual 
difference between these two cases.  B.L. not only consented to the birth, but 
also attended the insemination procedure.  It was not until after the child was 
conceived, that B.L. decided she no longer wanted to be a parent.  But in A.Z., 
a child has not already been born and the court is in the position to prevent the 
conception.  There is no life that will be affected by not enforcing the 
agreement.  The court in B.L. is not merely deciding whether to enforce a 
contract that only affects two adults and some sperm, but whether to enforce a 
contract affecting the rest of a child’s life who was conceived after a carefully 
deliberated agreement.  The majority takes no notice of the public policy 
implications of leaving a child to be supported financially by only one income. 
The facts demonstrate that T.F. and B.L. thoroughly discussed their 
decision to create a child, and endured a lot in order to finally do so. By 
contrast, there are three million unplanned pregnancies that occur in the United 
States each year.153  Courts do not hesitate to enforce child support obligations 
on biological un-wed parents of children who are conceived by accident.154  A 
child who is conceived intentionally by two consenting adults, however, may 
be left with the support of only one parent.  There is only one parent’s income 
that will go toward feeding the child, clothing the child, and paying for the 
child’s education. 
The policy espoused by the court of not enforcing agreements to become 
parents has no true application to this case.  Here, we are not talking about a 
decision to become a parent.  A decision has already been made by B.L. to 
become a parent, and since the conception took place, B.L. has become a 
parent.  She had adequate time to consider this delicate decision.  Now, B.L. 
should be forced to be responsible for bringing this child into the world.  The 
argument of the majority fails because they are analyzing the case as if the 
child was never born. 
The irrationality of referring to a public policy that is applied to cases 
where a child is not yet conceived, to a case where a child is already 
conceived, leaves gaping holes in the majority’s opinion and suggests that the 
 
 150. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1252. 
 151. Id. at 1059. 
 152. Id. at 1251. 
 153. American Pregnancy Association, Unplanned Pregnancy, http://www.American 
Pregnancy.org/unplannedpregnancy/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
 154. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 955, 973-74 (2004). 
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court was reaching for an excuse.  Was public policy driving the majority’s 
decision, or was this argument merely an attempt by the court to remain out of 
the midst of a broiling public controversy – legal recognition of same-sex 
families? 
The dissent, noticing the difference between a contract over sperm, and 
one that has resulted in a child, acknowledges that the agreement to create a 
child was unenforceable, but insists correctly that the agreement includes an 
enforceable promise to pay child support.155 
The decision to create this child was even more conscious and deliberate than 
the decision that is made by some couples who are both biological parents and 
conceive a child by direct sexual intercourse . . . . A person cannot participate, 
in the way the defendant did, in bringing a child into the world, and then walk 
away from support obligation.156 
Judge Greaney, writing the dissent, is successful in introducing public 
policies that support a decision to enforce the contract.  He notes that the 
Massachusetts Legislature, as the legislature in most other states, has long 
recognized the importance of child support for all children.  It has expressed 
the idea that “‘dependent children shall be maintained, as completely as 
possible, from the resources of their parents’ and not by the taxpayers, and that 
support determination should be made in ‘the best interests of the child.’”157  
Furthermore, the Massachusetts Legislature has in many ways supported 
assisted reproductive technologies and has made clear that the parentage of 
children born as a result of artificial insemination does not depend on biology 
but may be determined on the basis of consent.158 
With these policies in mind, the majority failed to focus its decision on the 
rights of the child that was born.  Although courts are reluctant to enforce 
parenthood contracts, the case presented here introduces a completely different 
issue.  The court is not determining whether an individual should be forced to 
have a child, but rather whether an individual who has already assisted in 
having a child should be required to help support it. 
VI.  POSSIBLE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES FOR SAME-SEX PARENTS 
The decisions of state courts to recognize actions brought to enforce child 
support on former same-sex partners vary greatly from one jurisdiction to the 
next, and rely on state and local guidelines and procedures that govern the 
action in the court in which it is filed.159  As state courts continue to strike 
 
 155. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1255 (Greaney, J., dissenting). 
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 159. JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001) (“State 
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down these support enforcement attempts, plaintiffs continue to find new 
arguments to persuade the court that ordering child support is consistent with 
the present laws of the state and coherent with the state’s public policy of 
finding for the best interest of the child. 
There are some precautionary measures same-sex partners can take to 
attempt to ensure issues of support do not later emerge after separation.  
Second-parent adoptions may be one way for lesbian co-parents to solidify 
their legal relationship with their children, as well as protect their legal rights 
should the couple later decide to separate.160  Although many states granting 
legal parenting rights through adoption to a same-sex co-parent require 
termination of the biological parent’s rights, a few states permit adoption by 
same-sex couples through second-parent adoption.161  Second-parent adoptions 
give the non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship the same rights to a 
child as the biological parent.162  A third party adopts the child, but does not 
disturb the rights of the biological parent.163 
Courts that have permitted such adoptions generally conclude that children 
are best served by having two legal parents.  A child with two legal parents has 
two sources of support and inheritance rights, as well as access to an array of 
benefits, including health insurance, social security, and other benefits 
provided by the parents’ employers.164  If the adults’ relationship later ends, 
their status as the child’s legal parents gives them both standing to seek 
custody or visitation with the child.  Additionally, both legal parents could be 
required to continue to support the child.165 
Currently seven states allow lesbian co-parents to adopt the biological or 
adoptive children of their partners.166  In sixteen other states, the legality of co-
parent adoption is questionable, as it has only been granted at the trial court 
 
controversy. . . [because] [m]ost family law statutes are drafted as general guidelines.  [S]tate 
court judges normally have broad discretion in resolving many family law disputes.”). 
 160. Osborne, supra note 104, at 368. 
 161. Martha Elizabeth Lieberman, Note, The Status of Same Sex Adoption in the Keystone 
State Subsequent to the State Supreme Court’s Decision in Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G., 12 J.L. 
& POL’Y 287, 297-300 (2003). 
 162. Tiffany L. Palmer, Family Matters: Establishing Legal Parental Rights for Same-Sex 
Parents and their Children, 30 HUM. RTS. 9, 10 (Sum. 2003) (“[M]any families relocate to a 
jurisdiction that allows second-parent adoption in order to obtain protected legal status.”). 
 163. Osborne, supra note 104, at 369. 
 164. Eleanor Michael, Approaching Same-Sex Marriage: How Second Parent Adoption Cases 
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level and has not been specifically approved at the appellate level or by the 
legislature.167  One state specifically bars lesbians and gay men from adopting 
children.168  Although second-parent adoption is gaining acceptance, it is 
generally easier for a gay individual to adopt a child than it is for a same-sex 
couple to adopt together. 
Private contracting among lesbian partners to arrange parenting 
responsibilities should the two women separate may seem like the ideal 
solution to the planned lesbian family.  A co-parenting agreement would prove 
the intent of both partners to create and raise the child and take on the legal 
responsibilities of parenthood, such as financially supporting the child.169  
Furthermore, it could also prevent battles over custody and visitation.170  
Unlike the children resulting from accidental births that often occur in 
circumstances involving heterosexual couples, the children created through 
artificial insemination by lesbian couples are almost always the result of 
careful deliberation and agreement.  Both partners plan for the pregnancy, 
provide emotional and financial support for the child, and assume the 
responsibilities of equal co-parenthood.171  Yet, most courts refuse to consider 
these realities when petitioned to enforce these parenting agreements.172 
The contract, a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes 
as a duty, is a classic device for the enforcement of private agreements.173 
Courts, however, often prevent contract law from entering into intimate or 
family spheres.  This reluctance is, in part, due to policy concerns of not 
wanting to “disrupt domestic harmony.”174  A policy rationale given to prevent 
contract law from entering the realm of un-wed cohabitants is the worry that it 
would “undermine marriage by threatening its exclusivity.”175  Imposition of 
the contract model on family agreements has traditionally been seen as 
inappropriate. 
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Beyond the difficulties of getting courts to recognize and enforce such 
contracts, there are also problems in attempting to fit agreements based on 
relationships with traditional contract doctrine.176  The focus of attention in 
most contracts is the deal making process to ensure that the exchange is the 
product of a bargain.  It is difficult to say that many promises in intimate 
relationships are necessarily made with the intent of receiving something in 
return.  More often, promises are found by the courts to be “mere gratuity.”177  
“‘Love and Affection’ it is often said, is insufficient consideration to sustain a 
bargain.”178 
Policy concerns still intervene and prevent courts from enforcing many 
family agreements involving children, leaving such decision making to public 
oversight.179  Since the mid-nineteenth century, the “best interests of the child” 
has been the predominant standard judges would employ to resolve custody 
and visitation disputes.180  Even if a contract is entered into before the 
conception of the child, there is no guarantee that the court will enforce it.181  
Courts do not hesitate to ignore agreements that they deem not keeping with 
the best interests of the child.182  Some contracts obligating non-legal parents 
to provide support have been upheld.  Domestic partners should research the 
law in their state to determine whether it may be beneficial to have such an 
agreement drafted by an attorney.  If nothing else, the court may consider it as 
a factor in the determination. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In areas of law where legislation has yet to provide for the best interests of 
children born through artificial insemination to same-sex parents, it is up to the 
courts to make sure these children continue to receive an equal amount of 
protection from our legal system.  When courts refuse to take action to enforce 
child support upon former domestic partners, the result is discrimination of 
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children born through artificial insemination based on the marital status of their 
parents – and a step backwards in time to when we blamed children for their 
illegitimacy.  As Professor Polikoff wrote over a decade ago: 
When parents create a nontraditional family, that family becomes the reality of 
the child’s life.  The child may experience some stigma, but courts should 
delegitimize, not condone, disparaging community attitudes.  The courts 
should protect children’s interests within the context of nontraditional families, 
rather than attempt to eradicate such families by adhering to a fictitious, 
homogenous family model.183 
The current legal landscape for lesbian-parented family dissolution cases 
involving a claim for child support offers valuable insight for several reasons.  
First, it illustrates the array of decisions that courts around the country are 
making in these cases.  It also captures the essence of a problem inherent in 
family law – that the state-based nature of family law leads to divergent results 
for children and non-legal parents around the country.  Finally, these cases 
provide an opportunity for both legislatures and courts to recognize a solution 
that is truly dedicated to the best interest of the child. 
Many children are born into families that do not conform to the one-
mother/one-father model.184  In recent decades, the law has taken great strides 
to eliminate the harsh discrimination of children born to un-wed mothers in the 
legal world, recognizing the innocence and helplessness of those children, and 
their right to the same opportunities as children born in the United States to 
married parents.185  Steps now must be taken to prevent a similar harsh 
discrimination of children born into non-traditional same-sex families.  Their 
innocence and helplessness regarding how they came to be should be reflected 
in how they are treated by the American legal system. 
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